Using proprietary data on bank-issued knock-out warrants, we nd that individual investors, on aggregate, bet on price reversals. In a simple model we demonstrate that a mechanical channel due to market and product characteristics may account for investors' betting on reversals, even if investors' purchasing and selling decisions are independent of past returns. Our empirical results suggest that the mechanical channel can explain almost one half of the association between past returns and individual investors' order ow, while the rest can be attributed to the disposition eect, that is, investors' higher propensity to sell assets from their portfolios that have appreciated.
Introduction
The popularity of bank issued retail structured products increased signicantly in the recent decade. In Germany, where these products are most popular, the total outstanding value of the exchange traded products (in Stuttgart and Frankfurt) was over e 68bn in March 2016. 12 The purpose of structured products is to liberate the retail investor by providing access to a wide range of derivative products, which was only available for institutional investors previously. As it is often argued by banks, individual investors have limited access to derivatives markets because they cannot aord the costs of maintaining a margin account. Therefore, banks designed structured products such that investors cannot lose more than the money they invest, which makes it very convenient for them.
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1 Deutsche Derivative Verband (2016) 2 In order to put this number in perspective, consider the fact that the total market capitalization of the 30 largest German companies is in the range of e 1000bn at that time. Also, Célérier and Vallée (2017) show that the total amount of sold structured products (including non-exchange traded) since 2000 is over 2 trillion euros. investors bet on price reversals. The nding is consistent with the disposition eect, that is, investors' higher propensity to sell winners from their portfolios compared to selling losers. In particular, after positive returns of the DAX, investors are more likely to sell their call contracts, while after negative returns, they are more likely to sell their puts. In addition, we demonstrate in a simple model that a mechanical channel due to market and product characteristics may also account for investors' betting on reversals, even if investors' selling decision is independent of past returns.
We start with the observation that a positive (negative) return on the underlying decreases (increases) the leverage of the available call warrant relative to the leverage of the available put warrant. In turn, if the leverage of available call is higher than the leverage of the put and investors allocate their funds randomly between taking long and short positions, then investors, on aggregate, end up having a long position. Our empirical results suggest that this mechanical eect can explain almost one half of the association between past returns and individual investors' order ow.
The market for knock-out warrants provides an attractive laboratory to analyze individual investor behavior for two reasons. First, only individual investors purchase these. Institutional investors have better alternatives, like standard options exchanges where counterparty risk is managed.
3 Second, banks oer both call and put options for the underlying assets which makes it equally convenient for investors to take long and short positions. In particular, investors do not incur the typical costs of posting collateral to their broker when short selling an asset. Banks quote prices for their oered warrants through standard exchanges, allowing individuals to easily access these and also resell them to the issuing bank, should they wish to do so.
Knock-out warrants (also known as leverage/turbo certicates) are barrier options, that expire before their maturity date if the underlying's price reaches a prespecied barrier. Technically (based on their payo functions), they are down-and-out barrier call options and up-and-out barrier put options. That is, the call (put) warrant gets knocked out and expires when the underlying reaches a lower (upper) bound or when they reach maturity without hitting their respective barrier. They are referred to as warrants because the issuing bank does not have to post a margin as collateral when selling these to investors (hence they carry the credit risk of the issuing bank). Since barrier options have some characteristics that resemble futures contracts, banks often advertise knock-out warrants as futures contracts and investors use these to carry out speculative bets. However, a distinctive feature of knock-out warrants is that their leverage sharply varies with the underlying's value. When the underlying appreciates the leverage of a call (put) warrant decreases (increases).
We have obtained transaction level data on warrants written on the German DAX index, a blue chip stock market index consisting of 30 major German rms. Our warrants are issued by a mid-sized European bank and were issued on a regional exchange.
4 For each transaction we can see a time stamp, the number of contracts exchanged, the price and, most importantly, the sign of the trade. Therefore, the classication into buy and sell volume in our data is exact. That is, we know whether investors are purchasing the warrants from the bank or reselling them to the bank for each trade. This allows us to track investors' aggregate position. The obvious limitation of the data is that we cannot link transactions to individuals. 5 3 Average value of a trade is below e 2000 in our sample, which also suggests that institutional investors are not present. 4 We have agreed not to name the bank who provided us the data. 5 Since the warrants are traded through an exchange the issuing bank also has no information As a main result, we show that investors bet on price reversals. That is, investors tend to be net buyers of call contracts after contractions in the DAX and, symmetrically, net buyers of put contracts after increases in the DAX.
However, as we demonstrate in a simple model, due to product and market characteristics a mechanical channel could account for investors' aggregate behavior. In the model, investors individually randomize between speculating for increases and decreases in the DAX by buying the available call or put warrant, respectively. Importantly, investors who arrive to the exchange have a xed sum to speculate with.
Therefore, if the available call warrant happens to have higher leverage compared to the available put warrant, then in expectation arriving investors open a long position. We label the dierence between the call's and put's leverage the leverage dierential. Our insight is that the leverage dierential perfectly correlates with past returns, introducing a mechanical correlation between past returns and investors' order ow.
Empirical results suggest that the mechanical channel is relevant. We bring our model to the data in a reduced form analysis by introducing the leverage dierential as a control variable. Our estimates suggest that our proposed mechanical channel accounts for almost one half of the association between past returns and investors' order ow. investors' total portfolio appreciates if the DAX index increases by one unit. Figure 1 conrms that investors build up long positions during contractions in the underlying and short positions during increases in the underlying. That is, they speculate on reversals. Figure 2 shows the available menu of call and put contracts represented by their barriers in our sample. Barriers below the DAX index represent call contracts and those above represent put contracts. Since the leverage of a given contract is inversely related to the distance between the barrier and the underlying, the leverage dierential of available call and put contracts varies signicantly. Finally, the leverage dierential of the highest levered call and highest levered put is shown on Figure 3 , together with investors' aggregate exposure. The correlation is remarkably strong, suggesting that the mechanical channel described above plays a crucial role in investors' positions.
Related literature
To the best of our knowledge this is the rst paper to analyze individual investors' order ow in the market of knock-out warrants. Banks oer knock-out warrants that enable individual investors to carry out directional bets, both long and short, in a about the investor's identity in a given transaction. convenient way. We show in a model that if investors allocate their funds randomly between long and short positions, the asymmetric leverage of oered products leads investors to speculate on price reversals through a mechanical channel. Our empirical results suggest that investors, in fact, bet on price reversals, even after accounting for this mechanical channel.
Our ndings are in line with previous research suggesting that individuals are contrarians. Contrarian behavior is a label for investors betting on reversals: a negative correlation of past returns and investors' net purchases. One interpretation of contrarian behavior is that individuals provide liquidity to institutions who value immediacy. Finnish (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001) , Australian (Brown, Chappel, Rosa, and Walter, 2006) and Chinese (Feng and Seasholes, 2005) investors, among others. We conrm the presence of the disposition eect on the market for knock-out warrants, a market in which individual investors drive the order ow. As a marginal contribution, we show that the disposition eect is stronger for puts compared to calls, that is, when investors speculate on contractions. For a recent review on individual investor behavior, see Barber and Odean (2013) .
Our highly stylized model is motivated by seminal theoretical papers as well as the empirical observation that individuals use nancial markets for sensations seeking, i.e.
to gamble (Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009; Dorn, Dorn, and Sengmueller, 2014; Kumar, 2009 ). The theoretical literature has used various assumptions to describe the behavior of individual investors. In seminal papers, noise traders introduced into rational expectation equilibrium models are often associated with individual investors who trade randomly due to exogenous reasons, like liquidity shocks (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . While these papers' main concern is market liquidity, we focus on individual investors' aggregate position in the knock-out warrant market when they randomly allocate their funds similarly to noise traders. This is consistent with investors betting on reversals: after recent appreciations of the underlying the value of calls increases, while the value of puts decreases. Hence, if investors have a larger propensity to close positions that secure gains, they will sell the calls, which is equivalent to betting on a price reversal. For example, the theory of realization utility proposed in Barberis and Xiong (2012) assumes that investors gain an extra utility from selling assets that have appreciated during the holding period.
This naturally leads to the disposition eect and is also consistent with our ndings.
Theoretical papers analyzing the strategic behavior of banks who issue innovative nancial assets for individual investors is scarce. Kondor and K®szegi (2015) build a model in which investors do not take into account that a bank has private information when it wants to sell an innovative asset to them. Compared to their model we only focus on knock-out warrants and analyze how the menu of warrants aects investor exposures. By focusing of short run eects we abstract from banks' strategic behavior, which would be a natural (though not trivial) next step.
The closest to our paper in terms of the type of data used is Baule (2011) who merges quote data with transactions data in order to recover the order ow of investors.
However, Baule (2011) focuses on discount certicates and investigates how banks use anticipated order ow in setting their quotes. The German tax code is exploited for identication, which favors investments held over a year and nd that investor demand is high for products that mature just over a year. In contrast, we focus on highly leveraged products, which are typically held for much shorter periods (often within day) and presumably for the reason to speculate on directional movements. In a broader sense, our interest in investor behavior and product design relates to the literature on how individual investors aect asset prices. Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) documents that investors are more likely to sell assets that gained or lost a signicant amount since purchase, compared to ones that hardly changed in value. An (2016) builds on this pattern and shows that stocks with both large unrealized gains and losses produce abnormal returns. It is argued that this is a result of individual investors exerting selling pressure on these stocks, due to their large movements. We also nd some indirect evidence in line with these ndings. In particular, trading activity concentrates to the most levered warrants, which have the most volatile returns. There is a growing literature that analyzes the pricing of structured products. The dominating idea in this literature is the "life-cycle hypothesis". According to the lifecycle hypothesis issuers quote prices that contain higher margins at the beginning of the product's life (when investors are more likely to purchase the products) and decrease the margin during the product's life. Since many investors resell the products to banks before maturity, the banks prot from decreasing the margins over time.
The reason banks are able to do this is that short selling of structured products is not allowed. The idea of a life cycle eect was put forward by Wilkens et al. (2003) . Wilkens and Stoimenov (2007) study the pricing of leverage products similar to the ones in the current paper. They nd that quoted prices signicantly exceed upper hedging boundaries and also theoretical values. Henderson and Pearson (2011) provides evidence suggesting signicant overpricing for retail structured products in the U.S. Compared to these papers we assume that warrants are priced fairly, and since we focus on the asymmetries of oered products in a static framework, the dynamics of margins should not play a signicant role here.
Banks have been very active in designing innovative products in order to attract individual investors' attention. This started a literature that investigates the complexity and performance of these products. Célérier and Vallée (2017) show that as yields decreased during recent years banks oered more complex products in order to attract investors with lucrative headline returns. Compared to them we focus on a standardized segment of retail structured products and focus on how individuals use these to place speculative bets. 6 6 While knock-out warrants are standardized, they are also dicult to be correctly appraised by
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes knock-out warrant and their trading environments. Section 3 introduces the model for individual investors' aggregate position and derives our testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents our empirical evidence, followed by discussions and concluding remarks.
Market and product characteristics
The German Derivatives Association provides an overview of exchange traded structured products.
7 The two largest exchanges where these products are traded are Euwax (European Warrant Exchange) in Stuttgart and Frankfurt Smart Trading, which is a specialized segment of Deutsche Börse in Frankfurt. Trading is concentrated to these exchanges, but most exchanges in Europe oer the opportunity for banks to issue structured products (and our data also comes from a smaller exchange).
There are over twenty banks actively issuing structured products. The issuing bank has to determine product characteristics and is required to continuously quote bid and ask prices, guaranteeing a liquid secondary market for its assets. Importantly, short selling is prohibited in these markets. This implies that banks may quote both ask and bid prices above the fair value of the derivatives.
When the product is introduced, the outstanding number of contracts is zero. The number of outstanding contracts increases if investors purchase products from the bank and decreases if investors resell the assets to the issuing bank. As investors may submit limit orders, it is possible for investors' orders to cross, which does not aect the outstanding number of contracts. However, in practice the bank is involved in most transactions.
A major dierence between purchasing a structured product from a bank via a stock exchange and buying options in an options market is that the stock exchange does not require the bank to hold a margin account. In other words, by purchasing a structured product from a bank, investors hold the credit risk of the issuing bank. As Baule et al. (2008) show, the issuer's credit risk is in fact reected in its quotes, i.e. issuers with lower credit risk are able to quote higher prices.
Products are broadly classied into two categories: investment products and leverage products. Investment products give over 95% of the volume. The most popular among them are those oering full or partial capital protection. Within leverage products, KO warrants are the most traded class, accounting for about half of the volume of leverage products.
Product characteristics of knock-out warrants
It is useful to x ideas about the particular derivatives that are analyzed, as it is often dicult to navigate within the variety of retail structured products.
We have two types of options, knock-out calls (KO call) and knock-out puts (KO put). The KO call is a call option with a barrier and is known as a down-and-out call, as the barrier is set below ('down') the price of the underlying and the right to exercise disappears once the price hits the barrier ('out'). However, there is a twist. The option has a residual value if the barrier is hit, and the upper bound of the residual value is individual investors. However, we do not address pricing in this paper. 7 See Deutsche Derivative Verband (2014).
the dierence between the barrier and the strike. Formally, the payo function of a KO call is
where S(t) is the price of the underlying at time t, t 0 is the date when the product was issued, B is the barrier price and K is the strike price and they satisfy B > K for the KO call options.
The upper bound of the residual is B − K. Once the price hits the barrier the bank has to close its hedging positions (i.e. sell the underlying), and if the price jumps below the barrier then the bank cannot close the position at the barrier. Hence, the residual value will depend on the price at which the bank manages to close its position.
This essentially shifts the trade execution risk to the holders of the option.
8 This is similar to a stop-loss order, where execution is not guaranteed.
9
KO put contracts are put options and can be approximated by up-and-out puts.
The barrier is set above the price of the underlying ('up') and the right to exercise is lost once the barrier is crossed ('out'). Similarly to the KO call, there is a residual value if the barrier is hit. Formally, the payo of a KO put is
where the barrier is always below the strike, B < K. 10
In Appendix C we compare the Delta and the Vega of a KO call with those of a vanilla call and a futures contract, in order to illustrate how KO warrants are priced relative to these derivatives.
11 Here we only focus on leverage, which makes KO warrants unique.
Since the Delta of the KO call is always close to 1, a rst-order approximation for the value of a KO call is its intrinsic value, S(t) − K call and for a KO put it is K put − S(t). Exactly for this reason, banks often advertise such warrants as futures contracts, with an automatic stop-loss (instead of getting a margin call). Note that our model generates exactly these prices, as C t = S t − K call and P t = K put − S t , due to the fact that we abstracted from knock-out events occurring before maturity.
Using these approximations to express the leverage of a KO call, one nds that
8 This argument assumes that the banks always hedge their exposure. However, if banks do not completely hedge their exposure then they do not have to close their hedging positions if a KO event occurs. Hence, banks might be able to prot from not giving the maximum residual value to investors. 9 Note that if the option reaches the expiry date without a knock-out event then the payo of S(T ) − K is received at the expiry date, T , but if the barrier B is hit then the residual value will be transferred to the investors' account a few business days after the knock-out event.
10 In practice, there is also a multiplier that scales the KO products. Since this multiplier does not aect the analysis, we chose not to complicate the exposition with it. 11 Delta measures the unit change in the derivative's price if the underlying's price increases by 1 unit. Vega measures the percent change in the proce of the derivative when the underlying's volatility increases by 1% point. It is clear from (1) that leverage explodes as the underlying's price approaches the strike price. 12 As expected, the futures always has a leverage equal to the inverse of the required margin. The leverage of the vanilla call is close to at, which highlights the fact that most of its value is the time value. To the contrary, the value of a KO call will be very close to the intrinsic value, which will imply that when its intrinsic value is low, its leverage will be high.
The mechanical relation of KO call and put prices, and also their leverage is illustrated in Figure 5 . Suppose a bank wants to issue a new KO call. Then it has to determine the call's terms, e.g. its strike price, barrier and maturity. Figure 5 illustrates that the chosen strike price for the call has an important eect on the initial value and leverage of the new product. Importantly, the new call's strike may result in a call contract that is either much cheaper and has higher leverage compared to the already available put product, or much more expensive with a lower leverage.
To sum up, the KO call does seem to be closer to a futures contract than to a vanilla call (stable Delta close to 1), but notable dierences still remain. The crucial property that sharply dierentiates the KO call from both a vanilla call and a futures is its leverage, which is highly sensitive to the underlying's price. Importantly, when a bank introduces a new KO product it may signicantly alter the prevailing asymmetries in the leverages of oered KO calls and KO puts. Since the product with the highest leverage will turn out to be the most popular product in this market, changes in the relative leverage of KO calls and KO puts will inuence investors' aggregate exposure.
A model of individual investor positions
Consider a three period binomial tree, where t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. There is a single risky asset, which has a value of S t at t. Between periods the risky asset either increases with a factor of u > 1 or decreases with a factor of d < 1. For the sake of exposition, we are going to work with an equal probability tree, implying that the probability of moving up and down the tree between periods is always 1/2. These probabilities also coincide with the risk-neutral measure, implying that 1 = (d + u)/2, as we abstract from discounting. We normalize S 0 = 1. As a result, S 1 ∈ {u, d} and S 2 ∈ {u 2 , ud, d 2 }.
There are individual investors who cannot trade directly with the underlying but can purchase warrants from a bank, who prices the warrants fairly. Trading between the bank and investors takes place in periods t = 0 and t = 1, while in period t = 2 the warrants expire. Those purchasing warrants at t = 0 may resell their warrants to the bank at t = 1 or hold their warrants until maturity (until t = 2). There are two warrants oered by the bank: one knock-out call, and one knock-out put.
Investors randomly choose between taking a long or a short position, and pick assets accordingly. Similarly, they hold on to their chosen assets for a random duration. At the beginning of trading periods (t = 0, 1) n investors arrive, each endowed with m money to invest. Each investor independently decides whether to take a long position or to take a short position, where the probability of going long is 1/2. 13 If an investor chooses to take a long position, she spends her money on knock-out calls, otherwise she 12 Note that the parameters used for this gure are given in Table 8 in Appendix C. 13 The results hold for any xed probability of going long. The crucial assumption is its independence of the past returns of the underlying. purchases knock-out puts. Additionally, a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of investors who bought warrants during t = 0, resell their warrants to the bank during t = 1.
Here is the timing of events: t = 0 1. S 0 is revealed (and normalized to 1).
2. Trading takes place: n investors arrive, who individually randomize between taking a long or a short position using their funds, m.
2. Trading takes place: those who purchased securities in period 0 resell them with probability δ. Additionally, n investors arrive, who individually randomize between taking a long or a short position using their funds, m.
2. Securities mature and are settled.
In the remainder of this section we rst analyze investors' trading activity and aggregate position if they would have access to the futures market. This serves as a useful benchmark. Second, we turn to the case in which investors are faced with the two products oered by the bank.
The futures market as a benchmark
Consider a futures contract that expires at t = 2. The futures contract serves as a benchmark, which allows us to analyze how investors would trade with futures if they had access to futures markets.
14 Importantly, we assume that a risk neutral market maker is able to take the other side of investors' net order ow, implying that individual investors' aggregate demand does not aect prices.
The futures market oers investors the opportunity to take long or short positions in the underlying risky asset. The value of a futures contract at t is denoted by F t .
Since we abstract from discounting, the value of the futures always equals to the value of the underlying, that is F t = S t .
It is standard practice that trading with futures requires a margin account. That is, if an investor wants to open a futures position (buy or sell futures contracts), she needs to transfer the initial margin into the margin account as collateral. In reality the initial margin is typically set between 5% to 10% of the contract's value and its amount depends on the underlying asset's volatility. Let the initial margin be denoted by margin. We abstract from margin calls in our setting by assuming that
that is, the initial margin is large enough to cover all potential losses that may occur before maturity. For example, if an investor purchases one contract (takes a long position) at t = 0, she has to post margin × S 0 as collateral. In the worst case (from the investor's perspective), when the underlying depreciates to S 2 = d 2 , she loses (1 − d 2 )S 0 , which is smaller than the collateral posted by inequality (2). Thus, the initial margin is large enough to cover even the largest losses.
14 Additionally, banks often describe knock-out warrants as futures contracts without the inconvenience of margin requirements. 
since the total expected money owing to buys and sells is nm/2 and the initial margin requirement is margin. Investors buy and sell more contracts if (i) there is a higher number of them (higher n) (ii) investors have more money to invest (higher m) and if the initial margin required / value of a contract is smaller.
Importantly, investors buy and sell the same number of futures contracts in expectation. This result is consistent with how it is often thought about noise traders, namely, that they do not systematically buy or sell assets. As a result, on average, investors do not have an aggregate exposure to the underlying. Volumes of buys and sells are also symmetric.
The same argument applies for period t = 1. In turn, no matter how the underlying evolves, in expectation investors have zero exposure in both trading sessions, which also implies that their aggregate position does not systematically vary with the underlying.
15
To sum up, we emphasize the conditions required for the above result: (i) margin requirements for long and short contracts are not correlated with past returns, (ii) investors' preferences for opening new long (instead of short) positions are not correlated with past returns and (iii) investors' decision to close a position is not correlated with past gains/losses. We continue with the discussion of the knock-out warrant market, where due to dierent product characteristics, condition (i) will no longer hold, leading to systematic patterns in aggregate investor positions.
Investors in the warrants market
Consider knock-out warrants. A knock-out call oers long exposure and the knockout put oers short exposure. Similarly to the futures discussed above, they expire at t = 2. Importantly, we assume that the strikes and barriers satisfy
where K call (K put ) is the strike price of the call (put) and B call (B put ) is the barrier of the call (put). Setting the barriers equal to the strikes helps our exposition, while setting the barriers outside of the underlying's range simplies derivations, since it guarantees that no knock-out events occur before maturity (this is similar to inequality
(2), which eliminates margin calls from the setup).
16 As a consequence, the payo of the warrants coincide with the payo of vanilla options.
The call's payo at t = 2 is C 2 = S 2 − K call 15 Note that this last statement would also hold if margin requirements would be dierent for long and short positions (but constant over time). 16 This is also the empirically relevant case, as investors can only trade actively with a warrant until it has not been knocked-out. while the put's payo is
Following the simple structure, it is straightforward to determine the fair prices of the warrants for t = 0, 1. In particular, the solutions are C t = S t − K call and
One of the features that separates futures markets from bank issued knock-out warrants is that in the latter investors are not required to post margins as investors cannot lose more than the invested amount. 
that is, all else equal, investors purchase higher number of contracts if (i) there are a higher number of investors (higher n), (ii) investors have more money to spend (higher m) and (iii) if the given product is cheaper (lower C 0 or lower P 0 ). Since all warrants are priced fairly, the expected prot of purchasing any calls or puts is zero. However, their payo, in general, depends on the evolution of the risky asset (S t ), implying that they have exposure to the underlying. Interestingly, the exposure a contract oers is independent of its price, since option payos are linear in the underlying. Formally, let V be the value of investors' warrants at the end of period t = 0,
. We dene EXP t as investors' aggregate exposure (to which we will also refer as investors' aggregate position) to the underlying at the end of period t (that is, after investors' purchase decisions), which, at t = 0, is equal to
Equation (4) can be interpreted as follows. Suppose investors hold H C 0 calls and H P 0 puts at the end of period t = 0, and the price of the underlying, S 0 , increases by one unit. Then the aggregate value of investors' portfolio increases by H C 0 − H P 0 . Thus, an additional call (put) contract increases (decreases) investors' exposure by one unit, irrespective of the contract's properties (i.e. barriers and strikes). This implies that buying a cheap contract has the same eect on investors' exposure as buying an expensive one. The expectation of exposure is equal to
17 In this setup the warrants are similar to real life knock-out warrants, since their value also falls close to their intrinsic value.
Since the denominator in (5) is always positive, the sign of the aggregate exposure depends on the level of the strikes, K call and K put , relative to S 0 . When K call and/or K put is relatively large (but still satisfying the inequalities in (3)) then the exposure is positive: if the underlying increases the combined value of the warrants increases.
The intuition is simple. When k call and/or K put is relatively large then the price of a call, C 0 will be small compared to the price of a put, P 0 . This results in an investor portfolio consisting of more call contracts than put contracts, in expectation.
Hence, investors, on average, gain if the underlying increases and lose if the underlying decreases. Investors' expected exposure is only zero if S 0 is the arithmetic mean of the strikes, as in that case the calls and puts trade at the same price. Now consider the trading session at t = 1. The new traders take positions similarly as before, implying that the expected change in investors' aggregate position from t = 0
where E[EXP 1 |S 1 , S 0 ] is the expected exposure of investors at the end of t = 1, conditional on the history of the underlying and δ is the fraction of investors who choose to resell their warrants to the bank before they expire.
18 The rst term in brackets corresponds to the total exposure of those investors who arrived in period 1, while the second term captures resells of investors who arrived in period 0. It is clear from (6) that when S 1 = d is realized, then the price of the call depreciates, and, simultaneously, the price of the put appreciates. Thus, investors who arrive in period 1 take a longer position compared to period 0 investors because calls are now relatively cheaper than previously. Similarly, when S 1 = u is realized, investors decrease their aggregate position. Thus, investors aggregate position suggests that they bet on price reversals.
The following proposition summarizes the main predictions from the model: Proposition 1 1. Share of transactions involving calls does not depend on past returns.
2. Share of call contract trading value is positively correlated with past returns,
3. Share of call contract volumes is negatively correlated with past returns,
4. Investors bet on price reversals, implying Cov[EXP 1 − EXP 0 , S 1 − S 0 ] < 0 18 Note that expectations are taken over individual randomizations on whether to take a long or a short position.
The proofs are straightforward, and shown in Appendix A. Since investors individually randomize between taking long or short positions and the probability of reselling warrants to the bank is independent of past returns, the share of transactions involving calls does not depend on past returns.
The second statement is that the share of call contract value (value of exchanged call contracts normalized by the total value of exchanged call and put contracts) is increasing with past returns. The intuition for this result is that if the underlying appreciates, the value of calls held by investors increases relative to puts. In turn, since the selling decision is independent of past returns, the calls resold by investors will have higher value than the puts.
Third, the share of call contract volume is decreasing with past returns. The idea is that after appreciations of the underlying call contracts become relatively more expensive, implying that for the same amount of investment, investors can only purchase a lower number of call contracts.
Finally, investors take positions as if they were betting on price reversals. This is the most surprising prediction of the model, given that purchasing and selling decisions are independent of past returns. Since the price of calls (puts) is monotone increasing (decreasing) in the underlying, if the underlying increases puts are going to be cheaper than calls and this will lead new investors to purchase a higher number of puts, eectively betting on a reversal.
It is important to emphasize that these results are conditional on not hitting any of the barriers, as we have assumed in (3). The moment a barrier is hit, investors' position will be closed automatically, implying that in that moment they are (passively) reinforcing market movements. However, our focus is on understanding investors' purchasing and reselling decisions, which are also conditional on a warrant being prior to a knock-out event.
To conclude, while the exposure individual investors may take with calls and puts is very similar to the exposure provided by futures, the contract features of knock-out warrants are xed in the short-run, which leads to an asymmetry of product characteristics between oered calls and puts. In turn, if individual investors allocate their funds randomly, their aggregate exposure will systematically vary with the asymmetries of the available menu. While the asymmetries in this simplied setup are only driven by the evolution of the underlying, in reality banks have the option to strategically time the introduction of new warrants, which gives them the (potentially valuable) power to inuence individual investors' aggregate position.
Empirical analysis
We have obtained transactions data from a bank on KO calls and puts that have the German DAX index as their underlying. Our data consists of all transactions that took place between the bank and investors from December 2013 to April 2014 (100 trading days) and includes all KOs issued on the DAX by our bank during this period.
19 There were 6 KO calls and 4 KO puts actively traded in the given sample period (see Figure 2 ). For each transaction we can observe a time stamp, the number of contracts exchanged, the price per contract and, most importantly, the sign of the 19 I.e. investor-investor transactions are not recorded, as the bank did not participate in these. Investor-investor transactions happen when investors submit orders that cross within the bid and ask prices set by the bank. trade. That is, we know whether investors bought contracts from or resold contracts to the issuing bank. This allows us to analyze investors' aggregate position in all issues throughout our sample. Table 1 provides descriptives for the transactions data. Note that we have omitted settlement transactions occurring after maturity (3 issues) or a knock-out event (4 issues). For both calls and puts there are more transactions in which investors purchase contracts than resell contracts. Nevertheless, the large number of investor sells suggests that the holding period of these products is short and that the majority of investors does not wait until maturity.
The median transaction exchanges contracts worth around e 500, while the mean value is over e 1600, suggesting a highly skewed distribution. Also, sell transactions are larger, on average, for both calls and puts, which is consistent with investors' higher willingness to realize gains than losses.
KO puts are slightly more popular among investors than calls, which is likely to reect that it is more dicult to nd adequate substitutes for puts. However, the leverages of calls and puts are similarly high, above 13, on average and also vary a lot, with standard deviations above 4.
For the analysis we restrict the sample by focusing on the highest levered call issue and highest levered put issue on any given day. As Figure 8 shows, the highest leveraged product is, by far, the most popular one. 20 This implies that whenever a bank issues a new call or put that has higher leverage than the already available ones, it is likely to attract most of the trading activity. Additionally, we omit the largest transactions by dropping buy transactions who's value exceeds e 33333 and sell transactions who's volume exceeds 4000 contracts. These approximately constitute the top percentile of their respective distributions. Table 2 shows the descriptives of the selected sample. By keeping the highest levered products on each day we loose about 11% of the transactions. The mean value and volume of contracts decreases due to the elimination of the largest trades, while they increase as a result of eliminating lower levered issues.
We aggregate our data to the daily level, where we carry out our main analysis.
Descriptives are provided in Table 3 . Using our selected sample, we compute the total number of contracts bought and sold by investors during day t of issue i and also their dierence. Similarly, we count the buy and sell transactions and their dierence. This leaves us with 100 observations for calls and puts each. Note that the dierence between buys and sells has a standard deviation similar to buys and sells, which suggests that buys and sells are positively correlated, i.e. day trading gives a signicant portion of the volume. Nevertheless, on a median (and mean) day, investors tend to purchase more contracts than sell, which suggests that at least some investors undertake longer holding periods. This is also conrmed, for example, by Figure 1 , which indicates large persistence of investors' aggregate position.
To measure the asymmetry in the menu of oered contracts, we dene DLev t as the dierence between the Log leverages of the highest levered call and put:
where S t is the closing price of the underlying and K call (K put ) is the strike of the highest levered call (put). We refer to DLev t as the leverage dierential. Its distribution 20 Note that the result also holds if trading activity is measured by the number of transactions or the trading value. is shown in Table 3 , while its evolution is also illustrated on Figure 3 . Additionally, Table 3 also shows the distribution of the (log) returns on the DAX index (×100) during our sample period.
In order to disentangle the eects of past returns and the asymmetric menu of the oered contracts we estimate the following specication on the daily data:
where i identies the warrant issue and t is the date. The dependent variable is the net purchase of investors measured by the dierence between the total number of contracts bought (Buys i,t ) and sold (Sells i,t ) during day t. R DAX t−1 is the return of the DAX index from the close of t − 2 to the close of t − 1. P ut i is an indicator for the issue being a put and DLev t−1 is the leverage dierential at the closing time of the previous trading day. 21 A set of controls known at t − 1 including the P ut i indicator, the total number of outstanding contracts of issue i, days since issuance and days to maturity are included in X i,t−1 . The constant term may be issue-specic, i.e. (7) may be estimated using xed-eects.
If investors systematically bet on price reversals, as predicted by our model, we expect β 1 < 0 and β 1 + β 2 > 0. That is, following an increase in the DAX index, investors should decrease their holdings of call contracts and increase their holdings of put contracts.
Parameters γ 1 and γ 2 capture the mechanical eect leading to Proposition 1. If investors allocate their funds randomly we expect γ 1 > 0 and γ 1 + γ 2 < 0, that is, when a higher leverage dierential leads investors to purchase a higher number of call contracts as they are relatively cheap compared to the oered put contract.
Results
Does investors' aggregate position systematically vary with the available menu of contracts and/or with past returns? We have already shown that the most levered products are the most popular ones within puts and within calls (Figure 8 ). Now we turn to the more interesting question, whether asymmetries in the product characteristics of the oered calls and puts systematically aects the position investors take. (1) conrm the prediction of Proposition 1. Investors, on the aggregate bet on price reversals. A 1% percent increase in the DAX index (which also happens to be close to its standard deviation) is associated with investors selling 1829 call contracts and buying similar number of put contracts (the raw standard deviation of the dependent variable is 8300 contracts) during the next trading day, leading to a net change in their position of over 3600 contracts.
Controlling for asymmetric leverage and product characteristics (column (2)) shrinks this association by almost a third. That is, investors tend to purchase a higher (lower) number of call (put) contracts when the leverage of the highest levered call is higher 21 DLev t−1 is also the approximate dierence between the put's and call's price. A call contract's price can be approximated by C t ≈ S t − K call and its leverage by C Lev t ≈ S t /(S t − K call ). Similarly, a put contract's price is close to P t ≈ K put − S t and its leverage P Lev t ≈ S t /(K put − S t ). It follows that DLev t−1 = ln C Lev t − ln P Lev t = ln P t − ln C t . than the leverage of the highest levered put. Adding issue xed eects further reduces the association. The results suggest that about two fths of the association between past returns and investor activity is due to the asymmetric menu of oered contracts.
The last two columns of Table 4 decompose the results to investors' buying and selling activity. These suggest that past returns signicantly inuence investors' selling decisions while playing no role in their purchasing decisions. To the contrary, asymmetric leverages play a more important role in the purchasing decision.
Taken together, investors tend to bet on price reversals. However, part of this eect is mechanical: even if they were to randomly allocate their funds between the highest levered call and put, the result would follow. Nevertheless, their selling decision reinforces the eect: after increases (decreases) in the DAX index, investors tend to sell a higher number of call (put) contracts, taking prots. This is consistent with the well documented disposition eect.
Is there heterogeneity in the results? To address this, we rerun the regressions of Table 4 on 
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The estimates in Tables 5-6 suggest signicant dierences between the behavior of wealthier and less wealthier investors. First, the asymmetric menu accounts for a larger fraction of the observed association between past returns and investors' positions when it comes to wealthier/larger traders. In particular, for larger traders it accounts for about half of the association (symmetrically for calls and puts) while for smaller traders it does not aect the slope for put contracts and accounts for less than half for calls. This suggests that people betting in smaller amounts are more heavily inuenced by past returns.
Second, smaller traders' purchasing decisions are also inuenced by past returns while larger traders' is not. The estimates in Table 6 imply that even after controlling for the asymmetries in the available menu, smaller investors bet on price reversals by purchasing more calls (puts) after recent negative (positive) returns of the DAX.
Since the value of transactions is heavily skewed, one concern is that the benchmark results might be driven my the behavior of a few large investors/trades, even after eliminating the largest trades from the sample. (Table 6) . That is, past returns seem to play an important role both in the purchasing and in the selling decision even after controlling for the asymmetric leverage of calls and puts. Surprisingly, though, the leverage dierential enters the xed eects specications signicantly. This suggests that investors place buy orders more frequently (compared to sell orders) if the product is oering relatively high leverage.
In other words, investors consider the relative leverage of calls and puts when deciding on the direction of their bets, which goes against our assumption that investors choose the side of their bets randomly. The eect is also asymmetric: for puts its negligible while for calls it is large. This would imply that there are numerous, albeit relatively small, speculators, who take long positions if the leverage of the highest levered call is suciently high and do not consider taking short positions.
To take advantage of our transaction level data, we plot the within day distribution of transactions on Figure 9 . Most transactions occur right after the exchange opens and just before the exchange closes for the day. In particular, due to day trading, the propensity to buy is largest in the morning hours and the propensity to sell is largest during the hours before closing. 
Discussion
The data conrms our main hypothesis of investors betting on price reversals. The asymmetric leverage of oered call and put warrants induces investors to bet on price reversals, on aggregate, even if they were to choose the direction of their bets randomly at the individual level. In addition, the data suggests that individuals bet on price reversals even after controlling for the mechanical channel.
The results are also consistent with investors' sensation seeking. Kumar (2009) demonstrates that individual investors who are likely to participate in state lotteries are also more likely to be drawn to high volatility (lottery-type) assets in nancial markets. Analyzing individual investors' portfolio using data from a German brokerage in addition to survey data, Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) show that investors who enjoy gambling trade more frequently. Investors are also more likely to gamble on nancial markets when other alternatives are less appealing. Dorn et al. (2014) provides evidence from both the US and Germany suggesting that lower prizes on national lotteries is associated with an increase of small trades in speculative stocks.
That is, individual investors substitute between gambling on lotteries and gambling on nancial markets. We also provide suggestive evidence on sensation seeking. In particular, the estimates of Table 7 suggest that investors tend to place long bets more frequently if the leverage of the (highest levered) call warrant is larger. That is, higher leverage attracts more bets.
We nd that past returns strongly inuence the selling decision of investors. Our results are consistent with the well documented disposition eect. Using data on individual investors' trading accounts provided by a brokerage, Odean (1998) nds that investors have a much stronger tendency (a disposition) to sell winner stocks from their portfolios than losers. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) provides evidence for the disposition eect from Finland. Dhar and Zhu (2006) and Feng and Seasholes (2005) argue that the disposition eect is weaker for sophisticated/wealthier investors. We complement these papers by providing evidence for the disposition eect in a setting where taking long and short positions is equally convenient for individual investors by using KO warrants. We show that the disposition eect is present on both sides.
Individuals tend to sell more calls (puts) after recent increases (decreases) in the underlying. That is, they are more likely to sell their warrants after it has appreciated.
We also provide suggestive evidence that smaller investors are more heavily inuenced by past returns. In particular, we show that investors who gamble in smaller amounts, tend to bet on price reversals, i.e. they purchase more calls (puts) after declines (increases) in the underlying. This holds after controlling for leverage. On the other hand, past returns seem to have similar eects on the selling decisions of both larger and smaller investors.
If a fraction of investors believe that the underlying's price exhibits mean reversion, then betting on price reversals is a legitimate strategy (before transaction costs), which would directly lead to our empirical results. There is evidence from lab experiments suggesting that people mistakingly extrapolate random series. Andreassen and Kraus (1990) nd that if people familiar with basic economics are presented with a sample series of a stock price that has a visible trend, subjects are likely to extrapolate that trend. Also, if the presented series does not exhibit a trend, people extrapolated mean reversion. Weber and Camerer (1998) and more recently Jiao (2017) also use lab experiments to determine the possible mechanisms that lead to the disposition eect and present evidence in favor of biased beliefs toward mean reversion.
The two competing explanations in Jiao (2017) are the preference based explanation and the belief based explanation. While the belief in mean reversion falls in the latter, prospect theory is the most prominent candidate in explaining the disposition eect. In particular, when risk attitudes are dierent for gains and losses, investors might be risk seeking if they hold losers and therefore choose not to sell the loser. On the other hand, in the domain of gains, investors might be more risk-averse, which induces them to close their positions. Jiao (2017) provides evidence for the belief based explanation. The disposition eect is strongest in those subjects who predict more mean reversion.
Our evidence is also consistent with investor overcondence. Tables 6-7 and Fig- ure 10 suggest that purchase decisions especially for calls are aected by past returns. Investors' decision to buy also depends on within day movements. In particular, investors seem to be following a "double down" strategy: they are more likely to purchase calls and puts at the end of the day if their respective values declined during the day. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012), who suggest the following description of an overcondent investor: when the price of the chosen product rises, overcondent investors believe that everything went as planned and realize the gains. However, when the chosen product depreciates, overcondent investors now see an even bigger opportunity to gain, therefore they increase their holdings of the given product.
Concluding remarks
We analyze individual investors' trading activity, focusing on how past returns aect their aggregate order ow in the market of knock-out warrants. This market is at-tractive to carry out such an analysis as individuals are arguably the only traders and taking long and short positions in a given underlying is equally convenient for investors.
Our results suggest that past returns play an important role in investors' trading activity. Even after controlling for mechanical eects due to the asymmetric leverages of oered contracts we nd that investors' aggregate trading activity is consistent with them betting on price reversals. More detailed analysis reveals that this is mostly due to their selling decisions, that is, investors are more likely to sell warrants after they have appreciated. This nding is consistent with the disposition eect. Additional results suggest that smaller investors actively bet on price reversals through their purchasing decisions, especially after depreciations of the underlying.
The main limitations of the paper are that we cannot link transactions to individuals (and their characteristics) and also that we do not consider the strategic behavior of the supply side, but assume that it is competitive.It is plausible that the behavior of individual investors inuences bank's strategies. E.g. banks may strategically time the introduction of new warrants and they may strategically set quotes for their products.
For purposes of risk and/or liquidity management banks might be inclined to design products that leave individual investors systematically exposed to the underlying, on average. Also, since the bank has the information advantage of knowing the number of outstanding contracts, it may nd it optimal to use this information when setting its quotes, which also aects investor positions. Hence, a better understanding of the supply side would be a natural next step.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
1. By denition, the share of transactions involving calls is i.i.d. and the probability of resells, δ, is also independent of all variables.
2. Using that E[S 1 − S 0 ] = 0, the covariance may be written as
Let the share of call contract trading value be denoted by f (S 1 , L 0 , L 1 ), where L t is the number of traders who arrive in period t and decide to open a long position (they are binomially distributed i.i.d. random variables). The expectation in (1) will always be positive because taking L 0 and L 1 xed the expectation can be written as
which will always be positive as f (·) is increasing in S 1 . Since this holds for all realized values of L 0 and L 1 , it also holds in expectation.
3. The proof follows the same logic as the previous one.
4. The covariance may be written as
where the equality follows from the fact that L 0 and S 1 are independent, that is
Then for all realizations of L 1 , the covariance simplies to
which is always negative as d < u. from the close of t − 2 to the close of t − 1 times 100. P ut i is an indicator for the issue being a put (and is also included separately in all specications but omitted from the tables) and DLev t−1 is the dierence between the (log) leverages of the highest levered call and put at the closing time of the previous trading day. A set of controls known at t − 1 including the total number of outstanding contracts of issue i (only known by the bank), days since issuance and days to maturity are included in X i,t−1 . We report p-values from F-tests for the joint signicance of Yes Yes F-test β 1 = β 2 = 0 (p-val) 0.000 0.030 0.003 0.179 0.000 F-test γ 1 = γ 2 = 0 (p-val) 0.021 0.007 0.000 0.015 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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R DAX t−1 / P U T i × R DAX t−1 and of DLev t−1 /P U T i × DLev t−1 , respectively. (1) (2) (3) (4)(5)
C The Delta and Vega of a KO call
In order to build some intuition for the pricing of KO products, it is useful to compare the behavior of their model implied prices to futures prices and to European vanilla option prices. These comparisons are useful because banks market these products by advertising that they have similar characteristics to futures, except that once the barrier is hit, their positions are automatically closed, so the investors do not have to hold a margin account. Also, by comparing to vanilla options, the eects of path dependence will become clear.
Consider a KO call. The following table summarizes the benchmark parameters for the contract used in this example. The underlying price is assumed to evolve consistent with Black-Scholes assumptions, implying that it can be characterized by the risk-free interest rate (r f ) and the volatility of returns ( closed form solution for the price of the KO call, assuming that the residual value in case of a knock-out event is the dierence between the barrier and the strike price.
23,24
Figures 1-3 show the ∆ (absolute price increase of given product if the price of the underlying increases by 1 unit) of the KO call, a vanilla call and a futures contract.
The futures contract always has a ∆ = (1 + r f ) T and it is well known that the vanilla call always has a ∆ < 1. Compared to these, the KO call has a larger ∆, implying that it is not identical to a futures contract. Observe on Figure 1 that ∆ converges to 1 for both options as they become heavily in the money. Figure 3 highlights the eect of volatility on ∆. Contrary to a vanilla call, the KO call has a more stable ∆, implying that it is more useful for directional bets than a vanilla call.
Figures 4-6 show the Vega (percent change in asset's value if volatility increases by 1% point) of the three products. Naturally, the futures always has a Vega equal to zero. Interestingly, the KO call has a negative Vega, implying that the KO call's value is decreasing in volatility. This is in sharp contrast with the properties of a vanilla call and highlight the important aect the barrier plays. Higher volatility increases the probability of a knock-out event resulting in the lowest possible payo. Observe, that as volatility increases, the Vega of the KO call will converge to zero as the knock-out event becomes a certainty ( Figure 6 ). Table 8. 23 Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) were the rst to provide a closed form solution for the value of barrier options under the Black-Scholes assumptions. 24 With this assumption the residual value can me modelled as an American style binary put option, which has a closed form solution in the Black-Scholes world. Table 8 . Table 8 . Table 8 .
